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University of Massachusetts 
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Synopsis 
The development of optimization theory has made important contri-
butions to the study of animal behavior. But the optimization approach 
needs to be integrated with other methods of ethology and psychology. 
For example, the ability to learn is an important component of efficient 
foraging behavior in many species, and the psychology of animal learn-
ing could contribute substantially to testing and extending the predic-
tions of optimal foraging theory. 
Introduction 
When the animal behavior literature of the 1960s is compared with 
the literature of today, it is apparent that a revolution has taken place. 
Many of the phenomena of behavioral ecology and sociobiology that 
are taken for granted today, that are presented in undergraduate text-
books (e.g., Krebs and Davies, 1981), would have seemed implausible 
just 15 to 20 years ago. This radical change in how we regard animal 
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behavior is due in part to the development of optimization theory. Op-
timization theory can be regarded as a logical extension of the adap-
tive approach to the study of animal behavior long espoused by ethol-
ogists (e.g., Tinbergen, 1963), but the development of optimization 
models has had enormous impact. By deriving solutions to specific 
behavioral problems, optimization models have generated testable 
predictions which have stimulated research, suggesting novel ways 
in which the fine details of the behavior of an animal could affect bi-
ological success. 
By focusing attention upon the behavior of individual animals, op-
timization theory also contributed to an important methodological de-
velopment, increased data collection with identifiable individual an-
imals over time, under natural conditions. Although this type of data 
collection was becoming more common before the advent of optimi-
zation theory (e.g., Tinbergen, 1960: van Lawick-Goodall, 1968), it re-
ceived additional impetus from optimization theory, which focusses 
on the behavior of individuals. The importance of this methodological 
development should not be underestimated. Many of the most inter-
esting phenomena of behavioral ecology and sociobiology could only 
become apparent after such data were collected. Examples include ad-
justments in territoriality and territory size in response to changes in 
nectar availability by sunbirds (Gill and Wolf, 1975), social competition 
within groups of communally nesting birds (Vehrencamp, 1977), the 
apparent avoidance of toxin-laden leaves by howler monkeys (Glan-
der, 1981) and adjustments in diet in response to changes in prey den-
sity by redshanks (Goss-Custard, 1981). 
In spite of these contributions, optimization theory has been sub-
jected to substantial criticism (e.g., Gould and Lewontin, 1979; see also 
Maynard-Smith, 1978). Much of this criticism has centered around 
three issues. (1) Tests of optimization theory are not legitimate tests of 
the hypothesis that behavior is adapted. (2) Many optimization mod-
els, particularly optimal foraging models, are too simple, in light of 
the complexity of the challenges an animal faces in nature (Zach and 
Smith, 1981). (3) The fit between the predictions of the models and 
the data is often only qualitative, and the apparent quantitative pre-
cision of the models is misleading. 
A problem related to these criticisms is that although optimiza-
tion models are based on the assumption that animals are perfectly 
adapted, there are many reasons to doubt that optimally functional 
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behavior will be found very often. For one thing, optimality would de-
pend upon the rate of evolutionary change being rapid enough to track 
environmental change, and some lag must occur frequently. There may 
be costs or constraints which make optimal behavior unlikely or im-
possible (Orians, 1981). Many situations may be sufficiently multidi-
mensional to rule out any single optimal solution. How can we resolve 
the apparent paradox of the practical utility of optimization theory 
with the substantial criticisms it has received and with the probable 
inaccuracy of its basic premise? 
The answer to this question is simple, and involves placing empha-
sis on the term practical utility. Our goal as biological scientists is to 
understand the animals we study. Ethologists and behavioral ecolo-
gists need to remember that the subject under investigation is behav-
ior, not adaptation, optimization or even evolution. Concepts such as 
optimization are theoretical constructs that we use to help us under-
stand and predict behavior, but are not themselves the objects of study. 
In this context, the question is whether a particular concept has heu-
ristic value, and for optimization theory the answer is clearly yes. As 
indicated above, elsewhere in this symposium, and throughout the an-
imal behavior literature of today, many experiments in both laboratory 
and field have demonstrated the practical value of optimization theory. 
From this point of view, many of the criticisms of optimization the-
ory seem unimportant. The argument that optimization theory does 
not provide a legitimate test of the adaptedness of behavior is cor-
rect, but largely irrelevant. There are other, more appropriate meth-
ods available to test the adaptedness hypothesis (e.g.. Curio, 1973). 
The qualitative fit between theory and data, and the relative simplic-
ity of optimization models present challenges for future theoretical 
and empirical work. And the reasons why nonoptimality often may 
be expected are reminders that optimization is a useful concept, but 
not necessarily an inherent characteristic of behavior. 
We are now at the beginning of the second stage of the develop-
ment of optimization theory. The first stage has been relatively short 
and quite exciting. During this initial stage theoretical advances often 
have proceeded more rapidly than empirical developments, and atten-
tion frequently has been focused narrowly on optimization theory as 
an end in and of itself. In a way, it reminds me of what happened in 
my laboratory when we got our first computer for the on-line control 
of experiments. At first we tried to do everything imaginable with it. 
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There were even experiments performed which, in retrospect, seem to 
have been intended to explore the limits of the computer rather than 
the behavior of the blue jays we were studying. But that first stage 
passed. We came to realize that some things could still best be done 
with the older tools—relays or stop watches. The computer then as-
sumed its rightful place as one of the tools we use for accomplishing 
our goal. Similarly, we must recognize that optimization theory can-
not do it all. The complete understanding of behavior will require the 
use of optimization theory, but only as one of the tools we use. Dur-
ing the second stage of the development of optimization theory, the 
information gained because of optimization theory must be consoli-
dated and integrated with other aspects of animal behavior. 
One of the functions of scientific theories which optimization the-
ory has served successfully is to direct our observations to particu-
larly enlightening cases. Situations such as the depleting food patch 
or the group of animals of varying kinship already have repaid our ef-
forts handsomely. However, the situations highlighted by optimization 
theory need to be examined more closely and comprehensively. There 
has been an occasional tendency to conduct research with a view to-
wards testing optimization theory predictions rather narrowly, and 
this has led to limited data collection. This may lie at the heart of the 
criticisms Heinrich (1983) has levelled at some optimization research. 
In other instances, systematic departures from randomness have been 
labelled optimal very quickly, sometimes even in the absence of an\ 
particular model, ignoring the definition of the word optimal and pos-
sibly curtailing further investigation. These problems ma) point out 
the potential costs of any device which directs our attention in a par-
ticular direction. When looking very hard for one phenomenon, oth-
ers may be overlooked easily. 
Although it may be difficult, we must guard against tunnel vision. 
When the behavior of an animal does fit the predictions of optimiza-
tion theory, the case is not closed. Many questions remain. We still 
need to determine how this behavior comes about, in terms of its 
physiology and ontogeny, for instance. And when behavior does not 
match our predictions very well, similar problems still remain; re-
working our models is not the sole task confronting us when the mod-
els are in error. 
Optimization theory overlaps substantially with ethology and com-
parative psychology in several areas. One of the most important of 
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these is the effects of individual experience on behavior. Many optimi-
zation models imply that previous experience plays an essential role 
in the behaviors that these models predict. For example, kin recogni-
tion, judgements of reciprocal altruism, or estimates of expected rates 
of intake within a patch could all depend upon learning and memory. 
One particularly intriguing and promising area for integration lies be-
tween optimal foraging theory (OFT) and the psychological literature 
on animal learning (see Kamil and Yoerg, 1982, for a more detailed 
discussion of this issue). 
Psychology and Foraging Theory 
Most optimal foraging models imply that the animal possesses consid-
erable information about the spatial and temporal distribution of its 
food. In many instances, this information could be acquired through 
previous experience. The resulting interest in learning on the part of 
ecologists is relatively recent. But experimental psychologists have a 
long-standing interest in animal learning. As a number of papers have 
pointed out, the approach of psychologists to animal learning has left 
much to be desired from a biological, evolutionary point of view (e.g., 
Hodos and Campbell, 1969; Seligman, 1970; Lockard, 1971; Kamil and 
Yoerg, 1982). In essence, the problem has been that psychologists have 
conceived of learning as composed of a few simple mechanisms which 
are quite general, both across species and across learning situations. 
In fact, psychologists made a very conscious attempt to study learn-
ing in biologically arbitrary situations. As Seligman has put it, “The 
very arbitrariness and unnaturalness of the experiment was assumed 
to guarantee generality, since the situation would be uncontaminated 
by past experience the organism might have had or by special biolog-
ical propensities he might bring to it” (1970, p. 407). 
Despite its shortcomings, the psychologist’s approach to animal 
learning represents a coherent internally consistent system. It has 
had its successes, such as generating techniques which have proved 
useful in therapeutic and educational settings with humans. But this 
literature has, for the most part, been ignored by ecologists (but see 
Pulliam, 1981). There are at least two reasons for this. First of all, the 
ecological approach is very different from the psychological. Whereas 
the psychologist is primarily interested in mechanism and laboratory 
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research, the ecologist is primarily interested in function and field 
work. Where the psychologist often thinks in terms of processes which 
are quite general across species, the ecologist often thinks in terms of 
each species as occupying a unique niche. These kinds of differences 
in basic approach make cross-disciplinary communication and un-
derstanding difficult. Secondly, the psychological literature on animal 
learning is a vast one, and is filled with special nomenclature (jargon 
to the outsider) which has been developed over the years, making this 
literature very difficult for a nonpsychologist to use. 
Despite these problems, the psychology of animal learning can be 
a valuable resource for the ecologist interested in the potential roles 
of learning and memory in foraging behavior. In the course of their 
80 or so years of research on animal learning, psychologists have suc-
cessfully solved a number of methodological and conceptual issues of 
the analysis of animal learning. It would be a shame for ecologists to 
have to solve these same problems independently. It would be much 
more efficient and sensible for ecologists to take what they find use-
ful from psychology. 
The overlap between animal learning psychology and behavioral 
ecology can be seen most clearly in those instances in which work-
ers from the two disciplines have carried out similar research. For 
example, there are strong similarities between the probability learn-
ing experiments of psychologists and the patch selection experiments 
of ecologists. In the typical probability learning experiment, a rat is 
placed in a maze and has two response alternatives on each trial—
it can either turn left or turn right. Each alternative is rewarded 
with food a certain percentage of the time, the two percentages usu-
ally summing to 1007c (e.g., 60-40, 75-25). The animal is allowed to 
choose left or right many times each day, for many days, until choice 
behavior reaches asymptote. Asymptote typically is almost exclusive 
choice of the response with the higher probability of reward. The psy-
chological literature contains many experiments of this general type, 
and a great deal is known about probability learning. For example, 
animals usually begin training by selecting each alternative with ap-
proximately equal frequency and reach asymptote through a gradual, 
incremental change in behavior. The more similar the two choices 
are in their reward probabilities, the slower the learning (Uhl, 1963). 
Several experiments in the optimal foraging literature are quite sim-
ilar to these probability learning experiments (Smith and Sweatman, 
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1974: Krebs el al., 1978). When an animal has two areas to hunt in, 
these areas can differ in prey density, and this difference can be un-
predictable from day to day. The model proposed by Krebs et al. (1978) 
conceptualizes the behavior of the animal facing this situation as con-
sisting of two discrete stages, sampling followed by exploitation. Dur-
ing the sampling phase, the animal should respond equally often to 
each alternative, gathering information about the current prey den-
sities in the two areas. Once sufficient information has been gathered 
to allow an accurate decision, exploitation, exclusive choice of one of 
the alternatives, should ensue. The model then calculates the optimal 
switching point, which depends upon variables such as the degree of 
difference in densities between the two areas and the length of the 
foraging bout. 
To test their model, Krebs et al. (1978) used a cage with two 
perches. The bird could hop on either perch, and these hops were re-
warded with food on a probabilistic basis. During experimental ses-
sions, the two perches differed in the probability of reward, and the 
better perch was randomly determined for each session. The inde-
pendent variable was the degree of difference between the perches 
in reward probability. Qualitatively, the effect predicted by the model 
was obtained. Increasing the difference in payoff rates decreased the 
length of the sampling period. However, the measure of the duration 
of sampling was an indirect one, the number of hops necessary be-
fore the bird settled in on one of the perches, making 90% or more of 
its remaining hops on that perch. Using this dependent variable as a 
measure of sampling, the quantitative fit to the model was very good. 
However, this quantitative fit may be misleading, since it depends 
on the post hoc estimation of some parameters of the model as well 
as the use of the 90% criterion as a measure of sampling. If this ex-
periment is viewed as a learning experiment rather than as a patch 
use experiment, the qualitative results are not surprising. As indi-
cated above, taking longer to learn about the better of two alterna-
tives when the differences between the alternatives is relatively small 
is a well known result in the psychological literature. A more criti-
cal issue concerns the shapes of the learning curves of the individual 
animals. The probability learning literature would lead us to expect 
a gradual change in behavior from equal choice of the alternatives to 
exclusive choice of one alternative, whereas the Krebs et al. (1978) 
model would lead us to expect a sudden, all-or-none change when the 
A.C .  Kamil  in  American  Zo olo gist  23  ( 1983)      8
sampling period ended. Although Krebs el at. (1978) did not present 
the relevant data on the time course of choice for individual birds, at 
least some of the birds showed the gradual change we would expect 
from probability learning (Krebs, personal communication). 
Despite these problems, the Krebs et al. (1978) paper is an impor-
tant one. For ecologists, it demonstrates that the problem of sam-
pling new or unpredictable environments can be investigated empir-
ically. For psychologists, the paper demonstrates an alternative and 
potentially more productive view of the probability learning situa-
tion. For example, the two-armed bandit model implies that although 
the bird acquires information gradually during the sampling period, 
the change in behavior produced by this information is sudden. The 
Krebs et al. (1978) approach also suggests more concern should be di-
rected at the problems that ensue when reward probabilities are sub-
ject to change, as do other ecological papers on patch use (Smith and 
Sweatman, 1974). 
I would now like to discuss three concepts the animal learning lit-
erature offers the ecologist: The effects of previous experience on the 
speed of learning, the importance of acquisition and transfer exper-
iments to understanding the variable’ controlling the behavior of an 
animal in a learning situation, and the potential importance of sched-
ules of reinforcement for foraging behavior. This should not be re-
garded as a complete list, only a set of useful examples. 
Experience and the speed of learning 
Many OFT models predict that foraging behavior should vary in all-
or-none fashion. The Krebs et al. (1978) model is one example, pre-
dicting that there should be a sudden switch from sampling to ex-
ploitation as a function of experience in the two patches. Many diet 
selection models predict that under any particular condition, an item 
either should or should not be included in the diet (e.g., MacArthur 
and Pianka, 1966). Psychologists have had experience with this issue, 
since a formerly important controversy was whether animals learned 
in a gradual, incremental fashion, or in an all-or-none fashion. They 
found that it can be very difficult to determine whether a particular 
incremental function found in an experiment is really a step function 
partially obscured by variability or a true incremental function. 
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One complication is that previous experience can affect the shape of 
learning curves. This is most clearly indicated in the learning set lit-
erature. The basic learning set paradigm consists of presenting an an-
imal with a series of many different two-choice discrimination prob-
lems. On each discrimination problem, the animal is presented with 
two stimuli, one arbitrarily designated correct, the other incorrect. 
The animal is allowed to make several choices, and each choice of 
the correct stimulus is rewarded with food. After several trials with 
a problem, a new pair of stimuli, defining a new problem, is intro-
duced, and so on. As learning set training proceeds, the shape of the 
within-problem learning curve changes quite dramatically. While early 
problems are solved slowly, in incremental fashion, later problems 
are solved much more rapidly, and the learning curve begins to re-
semble a step function (Harlow, 1959). The learning set phenomenon 
suggests that the extent to which foraging behavior will display the 
all-or-none functions predicted by OFT may depend upon the previ-
ous experience of the animal. For example, the birds tested by Krebs 
et al. (1978) might have begun to show more sudden shifting from 
sampling to exploitation with more experience in their perch hop ap-
paratus. In diet selection situations, the extent of partial preferences 
may depend not only on previous experience with the food types pres-
ent at the moment, but also on experience with similar dietary choice 
problems in the past. 
Acquisition and transfer experiments 
Another lesson of the learning set literature, as well as other types of 
animal learning experiments, concerns the problem of determining 
the “rule of thumb” the foraging animal may use in making its deci-
sions. Most optimal foraging models require fairly sophisticated cal-
culations to mathematically determine the optimal solution to a par-
ticular foraging problem. Presumably, the animal does not engage in 
these calculations, but uses some simpler rule of thumb which ap-
proximates the optimal solution (Krebs, 1978). It would be of consid-
erable interest to determine what these rules might be. This question 
can be translated into asking what stimuli control the behavior of the 
forager. For example, is the decision to leave a patch based upon the 
number of prey already found in the patch, the amount of time spent 
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there, or the amount of time since the last prey was found (Krebs et 
al., 1974; Iwasa et al., 1981). 
A similar problem arises in the learning set literature. What rule 
is the experienced animal using to solve new problems so quickly? 
Many different experiments, conducted primarily with rhesus mon-
keys and blue jays, indicate that these species use a response strategy 
known as the “win-stay, lose-shift” strategy (Levine, 1959). The ani-
mal remembers what has happened on the previous trial of the cur-
rent problem and either repeats (stays) or avoids (shifts) that choice, 
depending on whether it was rewarded (win) or not rewarded (lose). 
This research demonstrates that memory for recent events can con-
trol behavior in a flexible way, but is of little direct ecological interest. 
However, the types of experimental designs that have proven useful 
in identifying the win-stay, lose-shift response rule are relevant. Two 
of these experimental designs might prove quite useful in research 
directed at the response rules of foraging animals, studies of acquisi-
tion and of transfer. 
Acquisition experiments are those which examine the behavior of 
naive animals as they acquire learning set. For example, the papers 
by Harlow (1959) and Levine (1959) were particularly influential in 
demonstrating that even on the first few learning set problems, er-
rors were distributed very systematically, suggesting that the animal 
was using several response strategies. Since the win-stay, lose-shift 
strategy is the only one that consistently produces reinforcement, this 
strategy eventually dominates the behavior of animals with learning 
set experience. In foraging experiments, this would imply that more 
attention should be given to how animals behave when initially faced 
with a foraging problem. Too often, experiments are run by first ha-
bituating the animals to the foraging situation until their behavior 
stabilizes and only then beginning to collect data and vary the inde-
pendent variable. But behavior during the earlier stages may contain 
much information about the rules controlling choices during foraging. 
In transfer experiments animals are first trained under one set of 
conditions, then transferred to a different set. Transfer experiments 
are particularly useful when two or more possible rules of thumb have 
been identified, but only one will function efficiently under both sets 
of conditions. If the results of the transfer testing show a high degree 
of positive transfer, then the rule that applies to both situations is 
implicated. In the learning set literature, one of the most convincing 
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demonstrations of the win-stay, lose-shift rule is the high degree of 
transfer shown by some species between successive reversal train-
ing and learning (Schusterman, 1962; Kamil et al., 1977; successive 
training consists of using just two stimuli which alternate as the cor-
rect stimulus on alternate problems). Since the win-stay, lose-shift 
rule appears to be the only one that will produce accurate respond-
ing, the high degree of transfer strongly implies that this rule is used 
during both types of problems. In other cases, negative transfer may 
be found if the two situations involve different rules of thumb (e.g., 
Behar, 1961). 
These acquisition and transfer designs have implications for the 
field worker as well as the laboratory researcher. For example, young 
animals that are just beginning their foraging careers probably de-
serve more detailed attention. Another potential area for research is 
suggested by transfer designs. Situations in which animals experience 
sudden change in the characteristics and/or distribution of their prey 
should be studied. 
Finally, it should be noted that acquisition and transfer studies ap-
pear throughout the psychological literature, not just in the learning 
set area (e.g., discussion in Riley, 1969). I have used the learning set 
literature as a convenient example. 
Schedules of reinforcement 
Another area of animal learning research of potential relevance to for-
aging behavior is schedules of reinforcement. A reinforcement sched-
ule is a rule that determines when reward should be delivered ac-
cording to the behavior of the animal. For example, if every fourth 
response is rewarded, then a fixed ratio 4 schedule is in effect. If the 
first response to occur one minute or more after the last reward oc-
curred is reinforced, then a fixed interval 1 minute schedule is in ef-
fect. If the first response to occur 20 or more seconds after the last 
response is to be rewarded, then a differential reinforcement of low 
rate 20 second schedule is in effect. 
The psychological literature on reinforcement schedules is very 
large (e.g., Ferster and Skinner, 1957; most issues of The Journal of the 
Experimental Analysis of Behavior), and many different schedules have 
been defined. Reinforcement schedules can have an enormous impact 
on the behavior of animals, influencing both the overall rate and the 
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temporal patterning of behavior. From an ecological perspective, the 
problem with this literature is that the schedules that psychologists 
have investigated have been selected and defined arbitrarily, with no 
reference to naturally occurring patterns of reward, such as prey avail-
ability. Many of the most commonly studied schedules, particularly 
the variable interval schedule (Kamil and Yoerg, 1982), appear to be 
very rare in nature. However, given that schedules are known to have 
large effects on behavior, the perspective implied by the reinforce-
ment schedule literature could be usefully adapted by ecologists in-
terested in foraging behavior. If the naturally occurring relationships 
(schedules) between behavior and food were to be detailed empiri-
cally, then an integrative body of research could develop. It will be a 
challenge for the field worker to collect data that will allow the ac-
curate specification of this relationship so that ecologically relevant 
schedules could be constructed. 
One type of schedule of reinforcement with great potential for test-
ing many OFT models is the concurrent schedule. In some reinforce-
ment schedule experiments, only one rewarded response is possible. 
But in the concurrent situation, the animal can make two or more dif-
ferent responses, each of which can be reinforced on a different sched-
ule. This can be thought of as analogous to having two or more patches 
in which to hunt, each of which pays off in a different way—at differ-
ent rates, with different rates of depletion and/or repletion, etc. One 
of the variables psychologists have studied in concurrent schedules is 
the effects of a changeover delay, a delay imposed whenever the an-
imal switches from one response alternative to the other (Shull and 
Pliskoff, 1967). This is exactly analogous to the ecological concept of 
travel time between patches. These procedures easily could be modi-
fied to test many current ideas about foraging behavior, especially in 
patchy environments. 
Although conceptual contributions to foraging can be made by an-
imal learning psychology, the most important contribution may be 
more methodological. As was implicit in the discussion of schedules 
of reinforcement many of the apparatuses developed by psychologists 
could easily be applied to testing of hypotheses about foraging behav-
ior. For example, the one response operant chamber could be used 
to test the predictions of diet selection models (e.g., MacArthur and 
Pianka, 1966; Hughes, 1979) by having different stimuli associated 
with different schedules, simulating prey with different characteristics 
A.C .  Kamil  in  American  Zo olo gist  23  ( 1983)      13
(e.g., Lea, 1979; Collier and Rovee-Collier, 1981). In concurrent sched-
ules with two or more responses available, patch selection models 
could be tested (e.g., Charnov, 1976). Other traditional psychological 
apparatuses could also be converted to ecological use, as indicated by 
the recent development of the radial arm maze (Olton et al., 1981). 
Pulliam (1981) has suggested that psychologists may be better able 
to test many OFT predictions in the laboratory than are ecologists be-
cause of the sophistication they have developed in studying condition-
ing and learning. This is probably true, but an alternative approach 
would be for behavioral ecologists to learn to use these psychological 
techniques. This latter strategy may be more fruitful in the long run. 
In order to understand OFT, a psychologist must first understand the 
broader ecological framework within which it developed. This would 
require a considerable shift in general world view for many psychol-
ogists. Such changes are very difficult to achieve. But a behavioral 
ecologist need only learn some new experimental techniques. Learn-
ing new methodology is probably much easier than changing basic as-
sumptions and approaches. 
It is not impossible for psychologists to adapt an ecological view, 
and to apply their expertise to testing OFT (e.g., Lea, 1979: Collier and 
Rovee-Collier, 1981: Olton el al., 1981). Although trained as an exper-
imental psychologist, and originally interested in problems such as 
conditioning in rats (Kamil, 1969) and learning set formation (Kamil 
el al., 1977), over the past 7 years my research has focused almost ex-
clusively on problems related to foraging behavior. I have found that 
much of the training I received as a psychologist and many of the tech-
niques and approaches I learned can be used to good advantage even 
though my concerns are now primarily ecological. For example, the 
technique that we have developed in my laboratory for the study of 
the detection of cryptic prey represents a blend of the psychological 
and the ecological. In this last section I will describe some of the OFT 
related research we have carried out recently. 
Foraging for Cryptic Prey 
Our technique is based upon procedures developed by R. J. Herrn-
stein and his colleagues to study “concept formation” in the pigeon 
(Herrnstein and Loveland, 1964). In these experiments, pigeons are 
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shown many different images which are projected, one at a time, onto 
a pecking key in an operant chamber. Some of these images contain 
instances of a class of objects, such as people, while the rest do not. 
If the pigeon pecks at an image that contains an instance of the con-
cept, for example a person, then it is reinforced on a variable interval 
schedule. If it pecks at an image which does not contain a person, no 
reinforcement occurs. Both sets of slides are very variable in content. 
The issue of interest to Herrnstein was whether the pigeons would, 
in some sense, abstract the concept so that the\ would respond ap-
propriately to images the\ had never seen before. The pigeons have 
proven capable of this type of learning. 
This procedure, with its use of project images has great potential 
for a variety of different types of experiments. In our research we 
have modified the procedures by substituting blue jays for pigeons and 
cryptic Catocala moths for people in the projected images. We have 
found that jays will learn to hunt projected images for these moths 
(Pietrewicz and Kamil, 1977), and have used this procedure to test 
the search image hypothesis (Pietrewicz and Kamil, 1979, 1981). The 
technique has two major advantages. Many of the variables which can 
affect predator choice, such as the appearance, crypticity, and den-
sity of the prey, can be precisely controlled. It also allows for very ex-
act measurement of various aspects of the behavior of the jays, such 
as accuracy and search time. In our more recent research we have 
turned our attention to some issues suggested by OFT, particularly 
the marginal value theorem (Charnov, 1976: Fitzpatrick, 1978). In or-
der to test these models, each foraging bout in our simulation was di-
vided into travel, search and handling segments, and giving-up time 
(GUT) measured. The foraging bout takes place in an operant cham-
ber with two pecking keys, a small round key which the jay can use 
to start new search intervals and to give up, and a larger rectangular 
key, called the stimulus key, onto which images can be projected. Each 
foraging bout consists of many trials. Each trial begins with the illu-
mination of the round key with a white plus sign. This plus sign stays 
on the key for a certain number of seconds, called the travel time. Dur-
ing the travel time, responses have no effect, although most jays do 
peck at the round key. At the end of the travel time, a yellow circle is 
projected onto the round key. The first peck at this yellow circle be-
gins the next phase of the trial, the search phase. During the search 
phase, an image is projected onto the stimulus key, and a red circle 
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is projected onto the round key. The image on the stimulus key may 
or may not contain a moth, and the bird can end the search phase by 
pecking at either key. 
If the bird pecks at the round key, a giving-up response, both keys 
are darkened, there is a 2 sec delay to allow the slide projector behind 
the stimulus key to advance, and the next trial begins with the start of 
another travel time. If the jay pecks at the stimulus key, an attack re-
sponse, the round key is darkened and becomes inoperative. A 30 sec 
approach and handling time then begins, during which the jays usually 
peck at the stimulus key. At the end of this 30 sec interval, the next 
peck ends the trial, and, the stimulus key is darkened. If there was a 
moth in the image, a piece of mealworm is delivered; if no moth was 
present, no mealworm is delivered. In either case, there is a 2 sec de-
lay to allow the slide projector behind the stimulus key to advance, 
and then the next trial begins with a new travel time. 
In most of our OFT research, all of the images shown on the stim-
ulus key display two or three white birch tree trunks, photographed 
in the laboratory at a camera-to-subject distance of 1.4 m. The slides 
are made by setting the camera on a tripod, taking several pictures of 
a set of tree trunks without prey, then taking several more pictures of 
the same trunks with prey in different locations on the tree trunks. 
The prey in these slides are Catocala relicta, a species with white fore-
wings with black disruptive markings, which often rests, and is quite 
cryptic, upon white birch trees (see Fig. 1). Many slides are made in 
this way for any experiment, so that the only difference between the 
slides with moths and those without moths is, on the average, the 
presence of the moths. 
In this simulation, each slide can be considered a patch which may 
contain one prey or may contain no prey, a reasonable distribution for 
cryptic prey which usually are highly dispersed. The travel time rep-
resents the time that must be spent to reach the patch. Once the jay 
begins to search the patch it can either decide a moth is present and 
attack it by pecking at it, or it can decide that no moth is present and 
give up on the patch and move on to the next patch by pecking at the 
round key. Our measure of GUT is the latency to peck the round key 
when no moth is present. According to the marginal value theorem, 
which Fitzpatrick (1978) has shown can be applied to the zero or one 
prey per patch case, increases in travel time should produce increases 
in GUT, a result often obtained in multiple prey per patch situations 
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(e.g., Cowie, 1977). We tested this prediction in our first experiment 
(Kamil, Lindstrom, and Peters, in preparation). Five jays were tested 
at each of three travel times, 5, 15 and 30 sec. Each bird received each 
travel time for 5 consecutive days, and prey density was 269c through-
out the experiment. As predicted, increases in travel time did produce 
increases in GUT (see Fig. 2). 
Although the qualitative results are consistent with the marginal 
value theorem, more detailed analyses indicate that this model is not 
appropriate for our data. One  indication is shown in Figure 3; ac-
curacy changed systematically as a function of travel time. As travel 
time increased, the percentage of moths found decreased, while the 
percentage of correct giving-up responses increased. This result is 
not predicted by the marginal value theorem and serves as an exam-
ple of the importance of not limiting data collection to the dependent 
variables suggested by OFT. Further analysis showed that in most 
cases, the jays were leaving patches when their expected rate of in-
take within the patch as a function of time in patch was rising. This, 
and several other analyses suggested that the jays were not using time 
in patch exclusively in deciding when to leave. 
Fig. 1. A Catocala relicta resting on birch. The moth is located in the bottom half of 
the tree on the left.  
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This has stimulated us to begin to carryout additional experiments 
to determine what factors besides time in patch might affect GUT. 
Several experiments are in progress. In one experiment Peters and I 
are finding that the difficulty of the slide affects GUT. When the per-
ceptual difficulty of finding a moth was increased by increasing the 
camera-to-subject distance GUT increased considerably. In contrast, 
Olson and I have found that prey density seems to have no effect on 
GUT. When we presented two types of slides (pictures of oak trees vs. 
pictures of birch trees) which differed in their probability of includ-
ing a prey item, no effect on GUT was found. We intend to continue 
this empirical search for variables affecting GUT over the next year, 
looking at variables such as profitability and handling time in future 
experiments. 
Although the predictions of OFT have not been supported very 
strongly in this research to date, OFT has served a crucial function. 
Fig. 2. Mean giving-up times (GUT, la-
tency to reject an image without a moth) 
and attack times (latency to peck at a 
moth when present) as a function of 
travel time.  
Fig. 3. Mean accuracy of giving-up and 
attack responses as a function of travel 
time.    
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By directing our attention to the importance of GUT, it has stimulated 
us to carry out research which has revealed some interesting phenom-
ena which may prove of quite general importance. 
The cryptic prey situation is one that is particularly difficult to 
study in the field. It is hard to know where the prey are, exactly when 
the predator detects them, and when giving-up responses occur. This 
makes cryptic prey detection a particularly appropriate case for labo-
ratory simulation. The results we have obtained with procedures based 
upon operant conditioning techniques demonstrate the practicality of 
using psychological techniques to investigate foraging behavior.   
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